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Data generation methods differ across the empirical sciences. Today’s physicists and engineers 
primarily generate data with automated technologies. Behavioural, psychological and social 
scientists explore phenomena that are not technically accessible (e.g., attitudes, social beliefs) 
or only in limited ways (e.g., behaviours) and therefore generate data primarily with persons. But 
human abilities are involved in any data generation, even when technologies are used and 
developed. This article explores concepts and methods of data generation of different sciences 
from transdisciplinary and philosophy-of-science perspectives. It highlights that empirical data 
can reveal information about the phenomena under study only if relevant properties of these 
phenomena have been encoded systematically in the data. Metatheoretical concepts and 
methodological principles are elaborated that open up new perspectives on methods of data 
generation across the empirical sciences, highlighting commonalities and differences in two 
pivotal points: 1) in the accessibility that various kinds of phenomena have for the persons 
generating the data and for the researchers, and 2), as a consequence thereof, in the processes 
involved in the encoding of information from these phenomena in the signs (symbols) used as 
data. These concepts and principles cut across establish method categorisations (e.g., human-
generated versus instrument-generated data; quantitative versus qualitative methods), 
highlighting fundamental issues equally important in all sciences as well as essential differences. 
They also provide novel lines of argumentation that substantiate psychologists’ and social 
scientists’ increasing criticism of their own disciplines’ focus on standardised assessment 
methods and establish connections to concepts of data generation developed in metrology. 
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1. Concepts about methods of data generation in the empirical sciences 
Data are basic to all empirical sciences. A plurality of methods exists from which researchers 
must select those that are appropriate for their particular objects of research. Most 
methodological and methodical research is concerned with approaches and ways to analyse 
data (e.g., methods of statistical data analysis). But little discussion is devoted to the ways in 
which data are generated in the first place. Methodologies and methods of data generation are 
the focus of this article. 
Common terms are misleading. Data, plural of datum (Latin for “the given”), originally 
referred to what is given by the senses. But in our sensory perceptions, ‘data’ are not given to us 
ready to be ‘collected’ as we can pick fruit from the tree. Our perceptions are shaped by 
experiences and inextricably interwoven with our conception of the world (Berger, 1972; 
Chalmers, 2013). Even a fruit can be recognised as such only after we have acquired, early in 
life, sensory representations enabling us to perceive it as a steady object as well as concepts 
defining it as edible and thus valuable for us (Gibson, 1979). Thus, data cannot be simply 
collected. It is the scientists who decide what they consider an object of research, how they 
conceive it and which elements they deem relevant for study—and thus also what constitutes 
data in their field (Althusser & Balibar, 1970; Weber, 1949).  
1.1 Data generated WITH persons and data generated ON persons 
In the physical sciences and engineering, data are primarily generated with technologies. 
But in the behavioural1, psychological and social sciences, data are largely generated by human 
individuals—by persons. This is because these fields study phenomena occurring in individuals 
that cannot be captured technically (e.g., attitudes, social beliefs) or only in very limited ways 
(e.g., behaviours). For example, in assessment methods, persons are asked to indicate their 
subjective judgements of an individual or object (e.g., personality, attitudes) in questionnaire 
scales, thereby producing rating data. In interview methods, persons transcribe the verbal and 
non-verbal expressions of individuals (e.g., statements, pauses, utterances, gestures), thereby 
producing textual data (e.g., about social beliefs, political opinions). In observational methods, 
persons target their perception to specific behaviours of individuals and encode their 
occurrences, thereby producing observational data. But how do people accomplish these 
important tasks? While observers are trained to generate data in specific ways, most raters are 
lay people. What conditions must be met to enable persons to generate data? 
The different data generation methods and the different study phenomena explored in 
different sciences entail numerous conceptual and methodological challenges. To explore these 
challenges, various concepts have been established. In metrology (the science of measurement; 
BIPM, 2006), concepts of data generated ON persons denote research where humans are the 
objects of investigation (Pendrill, 2014). They are differentiated from concepts of data generated 
WITH person where humans are involved with their senses in the data generation process, such 
as concepts of ‘persons as data generation systems’ (Berglund, Rossi, Townsend, & Pendrill, 
2012), ‘human-based measurement’ and ‘humans as measurement instrument’ (Pendrill, 2014). 
These concepts highlight important differences in the ways in which data are generated in 
different disciplines. But they may not apply to all kinds of data generation and the 
differentiations towards which they are targeted can also be viewed in different ways, 
highlighting further aspects still not well considered. 
                                                   
 
1
 Behavioural sciences here refer to the fields of behavioural biology, behavioural ecology, ethology, human biology 
and related fields, but not to behavioural economics. 
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Specifically, in the self-assessments widely used in psychological and social sciences 
(e.g., judgements of own personality and own beliefs), the person generating the data and the 
person under study is one and the same individual (Pendrill, 2014). Thus, methodological issues 
emerging in ‘data generated with persons’ and in ‘data generated on persons’ cannot be 
disentangled. Other concepts are needed to explore the peculiarities and challenges involved.  
Moreover, not all data generation is aimed at generating measurements for quantitative 
analyses, such as methods producing data for qualitative investigations (e.g., discourse 
analyses, hermeneutic analyses; see Flick 2014). And not all data meet the criteria of 
measurement. Measurement is a specific process to assign numerical values to observations in 
well-defined and traceable ways (Mari, 2003; Mari, Maul, Irribarra, & Wilson, 2016). This does 
not apply to assessment methods where the specific aspects of the phenomena under study that 
raters may have implicitly considered in their judgments and the ways in which raters have 
encoded their overall judgements in the quantifying categories remain unknown (Uher, Addessi, 
& Visalberghi, 2013; Uher & Visalberghi, 2016).  
1.2 Jingle jangle fallacies across sciences: Are ‘measurement instruments’ persons or 
scales? 
Metrologists’ differentiation of methods in which persons are ‘operators’ of technical 
instruments from methods involving ‘humans as measurement instruments’ are aimed at 
highlighting important limitations and challenges that the direct involvement of human senses in 
the generation of data entails, such as for establishing metrological traceability (Fisher, 2009). 
Metrological traceability requires measurement results to be related to a reference through a 
documented unbroken chain of calibrations where the reference is a measurement standard or 
the definition of a measurement unit through its practical realisation (JCGM, 2012). But so far, 
these limitations are hardly considered in the psychological and social science fields of research 
in which such methods are primarily used (Uher, Werner, & Gosselt, 2013). One reason may be 
that psychologists and social scientist commonly consider as ‘measurement instruments’ not the 
persons who generate the ratings but the questionnaires consisting of sets of statements (items) 
and multi-stage answer categories worded in everyday language (e.g., rating scales; see e.g., 
Cripps 2017). As a consequence, all efforts of psychometricians to improve ‘measurement’ and 
‘measurement instruments’ are directed at the questionnaire scales (e.g., psychometric 
properties like item response function, reliability and validity) and not also at their users as this is 
the case in observational research where observers are trained to use an observation and 
encoding scheme in specific and systematic ways to generate data (Uher & Visalberghi, 2016). 
This cross-disciplinary jingle fallacy (the same term denoting different concepts; Thorndike 1903) 
about what constitutes a ‘measurement instrument’ is highly confusing and may prevent 
psychological and social scientists from understanding metrologists’ concepts and concerns.   
Further complicating is the fact that human abilities are always involved in data 
generation in all empirical—thus per definition experience-based—sciences, including physics 
and applications in engineering. This is because every concrete experience has two aspects, the 
content given and our apprehension of it—that is, the objects of experience themselves and the 
subject experiencing them (Wundt, 1896). Wilhelm Wundt, the founder of psychology, 
highlighted that this differentiation underlies two fundamental perspectives in which experience 
is treated in science. Natural sciences consider the objects of experience in their properties as 
conceived independently of the subject. Psychology explores the entire content of experience in 
its relation to the subject and the properties that the subject directly attributes to the content. 
Thus, the natural-science perspective is possible only by subtracting from the concrete 
experience the subjective aspect always contained in it and may therefore be designated the 
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perspective of mediate experience. By contrast, psychology does not (and cannot) subtract the 
subjective from experience because experiencing subjects and their apprehensions of the 
content given are this discipline’s objects of research. Therefore, psychology’s perspective is 
that of immediate experience. Psychological scientists seek to make abstractions and 
generalisations from many subjects’ experiences and those psychologists studying the biological 
foundations of psychical phenomena can do so only by exploring psychical phenomena as well 
(Wundt, 1896).  
The advanced measurement technologies available today have been developed to 
minimise the involvement of human abilities and their inherent subjectivity. But this should not 
hide the fact that they have once been developed by humans and on the basis of their human 
perceptual and cognitive abilities (see, e.g., the history of the development of thermometers; 
Chang 2004). And still today, it is humans who are using technologies to generate data and 
humans who make sense of the data thus-created. Determinating temperature with a 
thermometer requires human skills to perceive the extension of the scale or the signs displayed 
on screen and the ability and knowledge to interpret this correctly (e.g., differences between 
Fahrenheit and Celsius scales). Therefore, a clear-cut separation of methods on the basis of 
their involvement of human senses, as implied by concepts of humans as ‘measurement 
instruments’ versus humans as ‘operators of measurement instruments’, is not possible. 
These issues may have contributed to the fact that metrologists’ important concerns 
about the limitations and challenges of ‘human-based data generation’ (Berglund et al., 2012; 
Pendrill, 2014; Pendrill & Petersson, 2016) have hardly been noted by psychological and social 
scientists. And this although metrologists’ views can meaningfully complement and expand on 
the psychologists’ and social scientists’ increasing criticism of their own methodological practices 
that, so far, mostly concern the generation and analysis of quantitative data in their fields (e.g., 
Bruschi 2017; Buntins et al. 2016; Hammersley 2013; Morris et al. 2017; Tafreshi et al. 2016; 
Valsiner 2017). A prominent controversy is the debate about so-called quantitative and 
qualitative methods, which revolves around the question of whether or not behavioural, 
psychological and social phenomena can be meaningfully explored by means of quantification, 
what access researchers can generally gain to these phenomena and how findings can be 
interpreted (e.g., Bruschi 2017; Michell 2010; Sale et al. 2002; Toomela 2011). 
A frequent argument in the so-called qualitative-quantitative debate is that methods must 
be matched to the phenomena under study, thus be appropriate. But—in all epistemologies 
considered—this old dictum is as true as it remains vague. In what ways should methods be 
matched? What specific abilities must a method have to be appropriate? And what should it 
enable researchers to do? Psychologists and social scientist are surprisingly vague about these 
fundamental questions. 
1.3 Aim of this article 
This article adopts transdisciplinary and philosophy-of-science perspectives to explore 
concepts and methods of data generation across disciplines and to contribute to existing 
pertinent efforts (see Mari 2003). It presents a novel conceptual approach developed from these 
perspectives to carve out commonalities and differences in the ways in which data are 
generated in different sciences (e.g., physical sciences, behavioural, psychological and social 
sciences). This approach starts out by the fact that empirical data can reveal information about 
the phenomena under study only if relevant properties of these phenomena have been encoded 
systematically in the signs used as data. Consequently, this encoding and the ways in which it is 
accomplished in different methods are the pivotal points of data generation. The article therefore 
takes a step back from the common considerations of data properties (e.g., ordinal or metric 
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scales), data structures (e.g., norm-distribution), analytical methods (e.g., Rasch modelling) and 
theoretical inferences that can or cannot be drawn from the data (e.g., properties of the mind). 
Instead, it focuses on the conditions that persons (e.g., observers, raters, transcribers, technical 
instrument developers and users) encounter in the moments in which they generate data—thus, 
on stages in the research process before any mathematics or statistics are applied. That is, 
unlike most methodological research, this article explores not properties of data once they were 
generated. Instead, it explores 1) properties of the phenomena under study that the persons 
generating data can perceive and 2) the processes involved in their encoding in the signs used 
as data, thus on the processes by which data are generated in the first place.  
A focus is on research on individuals where ‘data on persons’ are generated using a 
plurality of methods, some of which involve humans directly (metrologists’ concept of ‘data 
generated with persons’ who act as ‘data generating systems’) and others only indirectly 
(metrologists’ concepts of persons as ‘operators’ of technical methods; see Section 1.2). The 
philosophy-of-science perspective adopted in this article opens up a more abstract level of 
consideration than commonly applied. This contributes a novel perspective that goes beyond 
behavioural, social and psychological scientists’ common arguments about so-called quantitative 
versus qualitative methods, and that also opens up new perspectives on metrologists’ concepts 
about the involvement of persons in the data generation methods of different disciplines. It 
presents concepts that cut across these established categorisations, highlighting fundamental 
issues that are equally important for all methods in all sciences as well as essential differences.  
The subsequent Section 2 briefly introduces the Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science 
Paradigm for Research on Individuals applied in this article and outlines its philosophical and 
metatheoretical frameworks that provide concepts for differentiating phenomena on the basis of 
their perceptibility by humans. In Section 3, these concepts are used to specify basic conditions 
that must be met to enable the persons generating data to perceive the phenomena under study, 
which therefore define basic classes of methods. Section 4 metatheoretically explores the 
encoding processes involved in the generation of ‘data’, specifying basic methodological 
principles underlying them. The final Section 5 demonstrates applications of these principles to 
methods concerned with the measurement of human psychical abilities, focussing on the so-
called qualitative-quantitative debate, on psychophysics and on psychometrics, revealing new 
insights and methodological mismatches not well considered. 
2. Transdisciplinary and philosophy-of-science perspectives on data generation 
Data cannot simply be ‘collected’—data are generated for a purpose. This requires 
decisions about what elements of the perceptible to demarcate, how to categorise these 
elements and how to encode them in the signs used as ‘data’. Raising an arm may be 
demarcated as an event of interest that could be categorised as a movement in itself considering 
the particular muscles involved (e.g., in physical therapy research). Considering the context in 
which it occurs, raising an arm could be categorised as greeting, threatening others or cleaning 
windows (e.g., in behavioural, psychological and social research). Observers may encode 
occurrences of this event in terms of every single arm movement back and forth or of series of 
consecutive movements demarcated from one another by breaks of non-movement; in terms of 
their duration, speed and radius as well as of the particular parts of the arm involved. Raters 
may be asked to assess this event in terms of how active, friendly, aggressive or industrious the 
person is. All this must be decided—if not explicitly by the scientists, then at least implicitly by 
the persons who generate the data about this event. These decisions have far reaching 
consequences; they determine what data are produced. 
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The specific conditions encountered by the persons who are making these decisions can 
be explored by applying a paradigm that adopts a philosophy-of-science perspective on 
research on individuals, the Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on 
Individuals (TPS-Paradigm; Uher, 2013, 2015a). It comprises interrelated philosophical, 
metatheoretical and methodological frameworks that coherently build upon each other; 
therefore, this system is called a paradigm. In these frameworks, philosophical assumptions, 
concepts, approaches and methods from various disciplines (e.g., psychology, biology, social 
sciences, physical sciences, metrology) are systematically integrated, refined and 
complemented by novel ones, thereby creating unitary frameworks that transcend disciplinary 
boundaries. Its philosophy-of-science label indicates the aim to make explicit the basic 
assumptions, metatheories and methodologies underlying given scientific systems to help 
scientists scrutinise and further develop the theories, models and practices established in their 
fields. 
2.1 Philosophical framework 
The TPS-Paradigm’s philosophical framework specifies presuppositions that are made 
about the nature and properties of individuals and the fundamental notions by which knowledge 
about them can be gained. First, it builds on complexity theories to consider that individuals are 
living organisms that can be conceived as nested systems that function as organised wholes at 
different levels of organisation, from cells over single individuals up to societies. From dynamic 
multilevel transactions, new properties emerge at each level that could not be predicted from 
knowledge simply of the constituents and that create complex patterns of causation not 
ascertainable by deterministic and reductionistic concepts and methods (Capra, 1997; Morin, 
2008). 
Second, it builds on the principle of epistemological complementarity originally introduced 
to quantum physics as a resolution to the wave-particle dilemma in research on the nature of 
light (Bohr, 1937). This principle highlights that application of different methods can reveal 
information about properties of an object of research that are maximally incompatible but both 
essential for an exhaustive understanding of it, and that may therefore be regarded as 
complementary to one another. This implies that investigations of an object of research should 
not be limited to just one method but without making methodological compromises. Rather, 
methods should be adapted to the properties of the phenomena under study. In the TPS-
Paradigm, this epistemological principle is applied in several ways, such as to the body-mind 
problem as already suggested by Bohr (1937) and others (Fahrenberg 2013), and to develop a 
solution for the nomothetic-idiographic controversy intensely debated in individual differences 
and personality research (Uher, 2015c, 2018).  
Third, the TPS Paradigm considers that all research is done by humans and thus limited 
by human perceptual and conceptual abilities (Uher, 2013; J. Valsiner, 2012). This does not 
imply denial of a reality that exists independently of human abilities and in which humans have 
evolved as a species over millions of years (Uher, 2015a). It merely emphasizes that the sole 
access we can gain to this reality is enabled by our human abilities, which, consequently, limit 
our possibilities for getting to know about, exploring and understanding this reality. This affects 
all sciences, including physics (see, e.g., the long struggles in the history of the development of 
thermometers; Chang 2004). But research on individuals is affected in particular ways because 
all scientists are individuals themselves who are embedded in particular sociocultural and 
language systems that inevitably influence their perceptions and conceptions of the world and 
especially of other humans around them. Therefore, scientists exploring individuals cannot be 
independent of their objects of research, which entails particular methodological intricacies. The 
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TPS Paradigm also highlights that research on individuals primarily relies on data generated by 
persons who perceive and interpret the phenomena under study. Therefore, a phenomenon2 is 
defined as anything that humans can perceive or can (e.g., technically) make perceptible or that 
humans can conceive. Occurrence of a phenomenon is called an element or (for transient 
phenomena) an event. 
These philosophical presuppositions form the basis of the meta-theoretical framework. 
2.2 Meta-theoretical framework 
2.2.1 Three meta-theoretical properties 
In the TPS Paradigm, three abstract properties are considered that can be conceived in 
different forms for every phenomenon explored in individuals and that determine their 
accessibility by humans. Given the paradigm’s focus on research on individuals, these 
properties are conceived with regard to human everyday life experiences, thus in terms of spatial 
dimensions scaled to the human body and temporal dimensions of the international time 
standards used in daily life rather than, for example, in the micro-dimensions of Nano-seconds 
and or the macro-dimensions of outer space. These properties are a phenomenon’s 1) location 
in relation to the intact bodily entity of the individual under study (e.g., internal, external), its 2) 
temporal extension (e.g., transient, longer-lasting) and 3) spatial extension conceived as 
(material and immaterial) physical (i.e., spatially extended) versus “non-physical”3 (i.e., without 
spatial properties; Uher, 2015d). The first two constitute continuous dimensions, whereas the 
third denotes properties that are mutually exclusive and complementary to each other. This 
relates to the body-mind problem, called the psyche-physicality problem in the TPS Paradigm, in 
which it takes the metaphysically neutral stance of epistemological complementarity, thus 
without making assumptions on their relative interconnectedness of either dualism or monism 
(Fahrenberg, 1979, 2013; Wundt, 1894). 
These properties are termed meta-theoretical because they are conceived on a level of 
abstraction commonly not considered explicitly in everyday life and most research, and only time 
and space constitute ontological categories. Because these properties generally determine a 
phenomenon’s accessibility to human perception, they also determine accessibility of further 
properties that can be perceived in phenomena (e.g., colour) or inferred about them (e.g., causal 
mechanisms) and that more commonly are the focus of research.  
2.2.2 Various kinds of phenomena 
The three abstract properties can be used to meta-theoretically differentiate and define 
various kinds of phenomena studied in individuals. These kinds are conceived on a high level of 
abstraction; they represent theoretical but not necessarily ontological categories. Their 
differentiation, as it is based on perceptibility by humans, is only conceptual; the phenomena 
themselves cannot be separated from one another in any living individual (e.g., morphology and 
physiology). Four kinds of phenomena, morphology, physiology, behaviour and the psyche, are 
conceived as basic because they are inseparable from the intact individual’s bodily entity (Uher, 
2015d). 
Morphology comprises living organisms’ bodily structures and their constituting parts; 
morphological phenomena can be located external and internal (e.g., hair, bones) and are 
temporally extended and material physical. Physiology denotes the physical and chemical 
                                                   
 
2
 This notion differs from various philosophical definitions (e.g., Kant's 2000). 
3
 The term “non-physical” is put in quotation marks because it denotes properties that are not simply contrasted 
against the physical but that are epistemologically complementary instead. 
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functioning of morphological phenomena (e.g., heart beats, neurotransmitter activity); they occur 
(mostly) internal, are (often) transient and immaterial physical.  
Behaviours are defined as “living organisms’ external changes or activities that are 
functionally mediated by other external phenomena in the present moment” (Uher 2016a, p. 
490). Thus, behaviours are conceived as entirely external, transient and (mostly) immaterial 
physical (e.g., movements, vocalisations, radiation). An important distinction is made between 
behaviours and the psyche. This differentiation of often made only implicitly in psychology as 
reflected in the vague notions of ‘outer’ versus ‘inner’ behaviours (Furr, 2009). This obscures 
vital differences between kinds of phenomena that differ in perceptibility by humans and 
therefore require different methods of investigation.  
Psyche is defined in the TPS Paradigm as the “entirety of the phenomena of the 
immediate experiential reality both conscious and non-conscious of living organisms” (Uher, 
2016b, p. 303; with immediate indicating absence of phenomena mediating their perception; see 
Section 1.2; Wundt, 1894). Psychical4 phenomena are conceived as located entirely internal to 
individuals’ bodies (yet without adopting ideas of internalism5). Ongoing psychical events, called 
experiencings, are transient (e.g., thoughts, emotions, motivations). They can be differentiated 
from temporally more extended psychical phenomena broadly conceived as memorised 
psychical resultants (experiences; e.g., sensory and mental representations, knowledge, mood 
tendencies, mental capacities, with memorisation here referring to any retention process) that, 
however, are accessible only in individual’s experiencings, in the here and now. This reflects that 
memorised knowledge does not exist like bones in a body that could simply be ‘retrieved’ ad 
libitum and (particular circumstances provided) be excavated even millions of years later. 
Instead, it is reconstructed in each moment anew in the context of the given situation, whereby it 
is adapted and changed (Schacter & Addis, 2007). The immaterial properties of the psyche are 
conceived as “non-physical” because they lack spatial properties and systematic relations to 
physical phenomena to which they are bound (e.g., brain morphology and physiology), reflecting 
complementary body-mind relationships (see Section 1.2.1; Fahrenberg, 1979, 2013).  
Three further kinds of phenomena are conceived as composite, semiotic representations 
(e.g., language), artificial outer-appearance modifications (e.g., clothes) and contexts (e.g., 
situations; Uher, 2015a,d). They comprise phenomena of different kind (distinguished by the 
three meta-theoretical properties) that are tightly interrelated with one another, forming a 
functional whole from which new properties emerge not present in their constituents. Therefore, 
these new properties can be explored only if the constituents are studied in their functional 
interdependence. A peculiarity is that these composites lack physical boundaries demarcating 
                                                   
 
4
 The phenomena of the psyche are of very special kind because they are the tools by which any science is made. A 
science exploring the psyche must therefore differentiate between its objects of research and its tools for exploring 
them. Therefore, the phenomena of the psyche themselves are referred to as psychical, whereas the term 
psychological refers to the ideas and body of knowledge (Greek -λογία, -logia) about psychical phenomena (a 
differentiation common in many languages but not in the English). 
5
 The conception of psychical phenomena as entirely internal essentially differs from ideas posited in the externalism-
internalism debate in the philosophy of mind about how individuals can get to know about the world if their psyches 
are entirely internal to their bodies as assumed in internalism. Externalism contends that psychical phenomena are 
affected by external phenomena and therefore cannot be only internal (Rowlands, 2003). In the TPS Paradigm, unlike 
internalism, no idealistic assumptions are made about experience-independent (a-priori) knowledge (as posited by 
Kant 1998; for a critical discussion, see Russell 2014). Instead, the meta-theoretical framework specifies connections 
between an individual’s psyche and its external surroundings that enable the individual to get to know about, to adapt 
to and to intentionally act in its surroundings (Uher, 2013, 2016a). Consequently, ideas of an ‘extended mind’ (Clark & 
Chalmers, 1998) are rejected. 
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them (e.g., cell membranes); instead, the phenomena involved are often located apart and also 
separate from the individual’s body. Semiotic representations exemplify this.  
Semiotic representations (e.g., spoken, written language) are composites comprising 
psychical and thus internal “non-physical” phenomena (e.g., meanings, mental representations) 
that are tightly interrelated with physical phenomena external to individuals’ bodies (e.g., vocal 
sounds, ink on paper). These external phenomena are used to represent in publicly accessible 
ways the meanings and referents to which they refer, forming a functional whole from which new 
properties emerge. This interrelation is so deeply embedded in our everyday thinking that its 
composite nature does not become readily apparent and may sometimes create the illusion 
meanings are contained in the spoken and written words themselves. The word “two” can be 
composed of visible patterns shaped like “TWO” or “DEUX” (French for two) written here on the 
page or the vocalisations [tuː] or [dø] that correspond to their respective pronunciations. In their 
composite, these external physical elements carry meaning that is not inherent to them in 
themselves, but that individuals only assign to them (see, as an example, culture-specific 
variations in the mapping of numbers onto space; (Dehaene, Izard, Spelke, & Pica, 2008; 
Pendrill & Fisher, 2015). When assignments are socially shared among individuals, the physical 
elements involved in this composite become signs (here the term sign includes the notion of 
symbol). Assignments of meaning are generally arbitrary and therefore vary. Nobody can 
straightforwardly recognise the meaning of “deux” just from the word itself without knowing the 
meaning that French speakers assign to it.  
This has important implications for research methodology because data are signs 
(symbols)—physical representations to which particular individuals (e.g., researchers, observers, 
raters) assign particular meanings and referents. Whether “TWO” or the numeral “2” represent 
the number 2, thus a quantity, or just a judgement category denoting “disagree” or “rarely”, as in 
many assessment methods, is not inherent to the physical sign “2” itself. This illustrates the fact 
that data cannot be simply ‘collected’ but are generated by humans who decide about what 
particular signs (symbols) are meant to represent for a given purpose. 
2.3 Methodological framework 
These and further metatheoretical concepts form the basis of the TPS Paradigm’s 
methodological framework. It comprises approaches for taxonomising individual differences in 
the various kinds of phenomena studied in individuals (Uher, 2008a, 2008b, 2015e, 2018), for 
comparing individual differences across situations, groups, cultures and species (Uher, 2011, 
2013, 2015b), and for carving out fundamental methodological differences between observation 
methods and assessment methods, empirically demonstrated in multi-method studies (e.g., Uher 
et al. 2013b; Uher and Visalberghi 2016). 
In the following, the above-outlined concepts are applied to explore the conditions that 
persons generating data in different fields encounter given their study phenomena’s peculiarities. 
From these conditions, basic methodological principles are derived that determine the ways in 
which these persons can perceive relevant properties of the study phenomena (Section 3) and 
can encode their perceived occurrences systematically in the signs used as ‘data’ (Section 4).   
3. The study phenomena’s accessibility determines the class of methods required for 
data generation 
When data on individuals are generated by persons, the methods of data generation 
used must enable these persons to perceive the study phenomena; this is the first pivotal point 
of data generation. The three meta-theoretical properties determine a phenomenon’s 
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perceptibility under everyday life conditions and, as a consequence thereof, they also determine 
the methods required to make it accessible under research conditions (e.g., controlled settings, 
invasive methods, technical instruments). Hence, the three properties are useful to derive basic 
methodological principles (Uher, 2015e). These principles define classes of methods that are 
more basic than those commonly considered and therefore cut across established method 
classifications (e.g., qualitative and quantitative methods, ‘humans as measurement instruments’ 
versus as ‘operators’ of such instruments), providing new insights into commonalities and 
differences (see Table 1). 
3.1 Phenomena located external versus internal to individuals’ bodies: Observational 
methods versus invasive and technical methods 
Phenomena located external to individuals’ bodies (e.g., outer morphology, behaviour, 
physical [i.e., acoustic] parts of spoken language), are publicly accessible and can therefore be 
directly perceived by the persons generating the data. Observational methods involve the 
targeted, and thus trained, perception of the study phenomena without any mechanism standing 
between the observer and the observed (see Faßnacht 1982). Binoculars facilitate observation 
over longer distances; but they do not make accessible anything that could not be perceived 
without any technical support at close distance.  
Internal physical phenomena (e.g., brain, bones, blood circuit) cannot be perceived by 
persons under everyday conditions; but they can be made perceptible under research conditions 
using invasive or technical methods. Open surgeries harm individuals’ bodily integrity so that 
investigators can directly perceive inner body parts (e.g., bones). Imaging techniques, such as x-
ray, ultrasound or MRI, can make inner body parts indirectly perceptible; but unlike binoculars, 
these technologies make accessible internalities that are otherwise not perceptible without 
destroying the bodily integrity of the individuals under study. 
3.2 Transcient phenomena: Nunc-ipsum methods 
Temporally extended phenomena do not change quickly (e.g., an individual’s body height 
or the physical elements of the words printed in a lexicon); this facilitates their perception by 
persons generating data so that they can take their time and can perceive the same elements 
also repeatedly. By contrast, to generate data about transient phenomena (e.g., individuals’ 
gestures, verbal comments or heart races), persons must focus their perception on these 
phenomena in the brief moments of their occurrence. This requires methods enabling the real-
time recording of transient events, called nunc-ipsum methods in the TPS Paradigm (from the 
Latin nunc ipsum for at this very instant; Uher, 2015d).  
This class comprises heterogeneous methods that are each targeted at a specific kind of 
phenomenon. In observations, the persons generating data record the behavioural acts they 
have perceived (e.g., a jump, start and end of an activity) while or immediately after these acts 
have occurred. Investigators can perceive and record an individual’s heart beats only while 
these occur; a retrospective recording is not possible. Real-time recording of transient physical 
phenomena can be supported by technologies, such as electronic heart rate monitors, audio-
visual recording such as videotaping behaviours (Uher, Addessi, et al., 2013), life-logging and 
reality-mining of individuals’ physical activities in real-live contexts (Eagle & Pentland, 2006), as 
well as ambulatory monitoring of physiological and behavioural phenomena (Fahrenberg, 
Myrtek, Pawlik, & Perrez, 2007; Matthias R. Mehl & Conner, 2012). 
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Table 1 Three metatheoretical properties determining accessibility by humans and the 
classes of methods derived from them 
Metatheoretical 
property  
Methodological implications  
 
Location in relation to the intact individual’s body  
 
Internal Invasive methods = Procedures harming the individual’s physical integrity (e.g., 
surgery, blood samples)  
 
Technical methods = Physical procedures making perceptible inner physical 
phenomena without harming the individual’s bodily integrity (e.g., f-MRI, x-ray) 
Introquestive methods (see below) 
 
External Observational methods = Procedures enabling the recording of phenomena 






Transient Nunc-ipsum6 methods = Procedures enabling the real-time recording of transient 













Physical methods = Procedures relying on the spatial extension of materials that 
are systematically related to the physical phenomena under study, directly 
perceptible and easier to demarcate and categorise than the study phenomena (e.g., 
length of a spring scale to measure weight). 
Extroquestive methods = Procedures for studying phenomena that individuals can 
perceive as from outside of themselves (e.g., behavioural observation) and that are 





Introquestive methods = Procedures for studying phenomena perceivable only 
from within the individual itself and that cannot be made perceptible by multiple 
individuals under all possible conditions (e.g., inner self-observation, self-report) 
• Nunc-ipsum introquestion = Self-reports about experiencings while they 
occur (e.g., thinking aloud method) 
• Retro-introquestion = A-posteriori self-reports of specific experiencings 
had in specific moments (e.g., interviews about own first-person videos) 
• Long-term memory-based introquestion = Self-reports about memorised 
psychical resultants (e.g., personality judgements).  
 
                                                   
 
6
 From the Latin nunc ipsum for at this instant.  
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3.3 Physical versus psychical (“non-physical”) phenomena: Physical methods, and 
extroQUESTIVE versus introQUESTIVE methods  
Physical phenomena (e.g., morphology, physiology and behaviour) constitute or become 
manifest in bodily matter. Their spatial extension facilitates their perception by persons 
generating data and enables the application of physical methods. Physical methods rely on the 
spatial extension of materials that show systematic relations to the physical phenomena under 
study, that persons can directly perceive and in which they can demarcate and categorise units 
more easily than in the actual phenomena under study. The length of mercury in glass tubes, for 
example, is systematically (though not linearly) related to temperature (see Chang 2004); the 
extension of this material can be directly perceived and facilitates the intersubjective 
categorisation of units to determine degrees of temperature.  
But the immaterial phenomena of the psyche lack spatial properties. Unlike, immaterial 
physical phenomena (e.g., heat, sound waves), thoughts and emotions cannot be measured in 
terms of their weight or length on spatial scales. Psychical phenomena are obviously bound and 
related to physical phenomena (e.g., brain morphology and physiology), but systematic relations 
that could enable indirect explorations have not yet been found (Fahrenberg, 2013). These “non-
physical” properties make psychical phenomena inaccessible by physical methods. 
Neuroscientific technologies, such as fMRI and EEG, can capture blood flow and electric 
neuronal activity in the brain but cannot make perceptible individuals’ thoughts and feelings; this 
reflects the complementarity of the psyche-physicality relations. 
To distinguish methods that enable the investigation of psychical phenomena from those 
that cannot, the concepts of extroquestive and introquestive methods (from the Latin quaerere 
for to seek, enquire) are introduced (Uher, 2015d). All procedures enabling the study of 
phenomena that are or can (technically) be made perceptible by others are extroquestive 
methods. This enables multiple individuals (e.g., scientists) to observe one and the same 
element, which facilitates the ability to arrive at an intersubjective consensus on how to 
demarcate and categorise elements (e.g., different kinds of neurons) and on how to encode 
them in the signs used as ‘data’, thus making the process of data generation public. Shared 
perception is important for establishing independence from individual investigators, which 
constitutes one of various types of objectivity in science (Daston & Galison, 2007; Gigerenzer, 
1987).  
Establishing shared perception is possible for all physical phenomena both internal (e.g., 
brain morphology, physiology) and external to individuals’ bodies (e.g., behaviour, facial 
expressions and verbalisations of emotions, mercury in glass tubes). But this is not possible for 
psychical phenomena (e.g., emotions in themselves), which are perceivable only by each 
individual itself. Imperceptibility by others is a unique property of psychical phenomena (Uher, 
2015a); it is therefore the crucial criterion to distinguish methods that enable investigation of 
psychical phenomena from those that do not. All procedures for studying phenomena that can 
be perceived only from within the individual itself but by nobody else in principle under all 
possible conditions are introquestive methods.  
Importantly, the study phenomena’s internal location alone does not define a method as 
introquestive. For example, physicians apply ultrasonic or endoscopic technologies to make 
internal properties of individuals’ bodies (e.g., tissue structures) visible on screens that also the 
studied individuals themselves can perceive as from outside of their bodies, thus 
extroquestively. But the sensations that ultrasound and endoscopic investigations may cause 
(e.g. pressure, pains) can be perceived only by and from within the individual under study and by 
nobody else, thus only introquestively. Similarly, dentists can see a tooth damage and can use 
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invasive and technical methods to also make visible structures hidden in patients’ teeth and jaw 
bones (e.g., on x-ray); but no dentist can perceive the patients’ tooth pain.  
This criterion-based definition and distinction of introquestion from extroquestion 
essentially differs from concepts of introspection and extrospection, which are commonly 
distinguished from one another on the basis of the individual under study, whereby introspection 
denotes individuals’ “inward perspectives” on their own experiencings and extrospection 
individuals’ “outward perspectives” onto their “outer world” (Butler, 2013; Schwitzgebel, 2016). 
But in individuals’ immediate experiential reality, “inward” and “outward” perspectives are not 
given as separate channels of information. Perceptions are complex unities that emerge from 
the composite of all information available at any given moment (Wundt, 1896). Therefore, 
extrospection and introspection cannot be clearly differentiated as separate methods (Uher, 
2016a).  
This challenge arises because all explorations involve human perception (see Section 
1.2). Distinctions are possible only by defining what is being perceived and by whom. 
Accordingly, the concepts of extroquestion and introquestion are defined and distinguished from 
another by 1) the particular phenomena under study (e.g., neurons, thoughts), considering that 
various other phenomena may be present and perceivable as well, and 2) the particular persons 
who perceive the phenomena under study and who generate the data of them on the basis of 
these perceptions (e.g., observers, individuals under study). This opens up a further conceptual 
dimension that lies across metrologists’ concepts of ‘data on persons’ generated ‘with persons’ 
(see Section 1) and that highlights challenges and essential differences that investigations of the 
various kinds of phenomena studied in individuals entail. 
3.3.1 Others’ psychical phenomena: Indirect exploration through externalisations  
The introquestive accessibility of psychical phenomena entails that their scientific 
exploration is possible only indirectly through inferences from individuals’ externalisations. The 
term ‘externalisations’ indicates that it denotes phenomena located external to the studied 
individuals’ bodies that are therefore perceptible by others, such as by persons generating data. 
This reflects the explicit conceptual differentiation of psychical phenomena (e.g., emotions in 
themselves) from other kinds of phenomena with which they may but need not co-occur, such as 
their (possible) expression in behaviour (e.g., facial expression of emotion) or language (e.g., 
verbalisation of emotions; see Figure 1; Section 2.2.2; Uher, 2016a). But importantly, these 
external physical phenomena are not one-to-one reflections of individuals’ psychical phenomena 
because externalisations can be controlled and modified and may also be misinterpreted by 
others. Therefore, inferences to others’ psychical phenomena are inherently fallible 
(Schwitzgebel, 2016; Uher, 2013). Moreover, not all important psychical phenomena can be 
consciously perceived (Freud, 1915) and be verbalised easily (Kant, 2000; Kelly, 1963). 
Consequently, exploring psychical phenomena imperatively involves also the study of 
behaviour and semiotic representations (e.g., language, (Bühler, 1999; Jaan Valsiner, 1998), 
which requires the purposeful combination of introquestion and extroquestion as complementary 
methods (see the principle of complementarity; Section 2.1). Introquestive methods are needed 
to help individuals become aware of and conceive the psychical phenomena under study, such 
as through inner self-observation. The introquesting individual must then externalise the 
outcomes of its introquestion to make them accessible to others, such as through self-report. 
These externalisations can only be made by the individual under study. Therefore, introquestion 
denotes not only trained or guided inner self-observation as this is common for introspection 
(e.g., Butler, 2013) but broadly denotes all methods relying on inner self-observation and self-
report.  
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To explore and categorise these externalisations, because they are external and thus 
perceptible by multiple individuals, extroquestive methods must be applied, such as behavioural 
observation (e.g., using computerised and videographic techniques) or recording of language in 
audio or text (e.g., in interviews). Thus, data about an individual’s externalisations can be 
generated not only by the individual itself (apart from externalisations that it cannot perceive like 
some facial expressions) but also by others (e.g., observers). Inferring from an individual’s 
externalisations the actual psychical phenomena under study, in turn (see Figure 1), requires 
hermeneutic-interpretive methods to establish an intersubjective consensus on the specific 
inferences made (Fahrenberg, 2002; Wong, 2009) and in which researchers must also critically 
reflect on their own interpretations (Uwe. Flick, 2008).  




3.3.2 The role of time: Nunc-ipsum introquestion, retro-introquestion and long-term 
memory-based introquestion capture different kinds of psychical phenomena 
The special temporal properties of psychical phenomena allow the distinction of various 
kinds of introquestion. The transient properties of individuals’ ongoing experiencings actually 
require real-time explorations, thus methods of nunc-ipsum introquestion. In thinking aloud 
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methods, for example, individuals are asked to verbalise their thoughts while they are having 
them. But attention and externalisation inevitably alter the course of experiencings (Kant, 2016). 
This entails particular intricacies and hinders nunc-ipsum explorations of more complex 
experiencings, thus allowing explorations of only brief experiencings, such as sensory 
perceptions as studied in psychophysics (see Section 5.2; Wundt, 1904). 
In retro-introquestive methods, individuals are therefore given a task and are asked, after 
its completion, to reconstruct and externalise the experiencings that occurred while executing it, 
thus ex post facto and without disturbing them—but necessarily at the expense of those already 
forgotten or that cannot be easily verbalised (Valsiner, 2017). First-person videos in which 
individuals’ activities are captured with miniature cameras worn at eye level can provide detailed 
contextual cues that facilitate access to episodic memory. Individuals’ accuracy in recalling their 
activities and the situations encountered, as verifiable by the videotaped evidence, supports 
assumptions that their reconstructions of the experiencings they had in the particular moments 
captured on film may also be substantially accurate, especially when they do not follow common 
schemata (Lahlou, 2011).  
But with increasing time lags between the experiencings under study and their 
introquestive reconstruction, individuals’ memories of specific events fade and are changed 
through subsequent experiencings, their processing and memorisation. Further changes are 
introduced through individuals’ active imagination and mental simulation of experiencings and 
their projection into the future (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2007). With 
increasing time lags, individuals will therefore more likely reconstruct experiencings that they 
believe they had or ought to have had rather than the particular ones that they actually had at a 
given moment. To reduce fallacies of memory (Schacter, 1999), application in closest possible 
temporal proximity to the particular experiencings studied therefore is an essential criterion for 
retro-introquestive methods. 
Self-reports are constructed in the moment of inquiry, thus in individuals’ experiencings. 
But the self-reported content in itself need not refer to specific experiencings an individual has 
had in particular moments. Self-reports can also reflect individuals’ overall considerations of the 
experiencings they commonly have, thus the ideas, self-knowledge and personal narratives that 
individuals have developed about their experiencings (e.g., narrative identities, McAdams 2001, 
or personal projects, Little 2014; see Uher 2016b). These memorised psychical resultants, 
because they are temporally extended, can be captured with methods of long-term memory-
based introquestion. In these methods, the persons who generate data reconstruct from their 
memories information, beliefs and ideas that they have about somebody or something. 
Personality questionnaires, for example, ask individuals to judge their “habitual” thoughts and 
feelings. Importantly, these questionnaires capture not the particular thoughts and feelings in 
themselves that individuals may have had in particular moments, but the generalised ideas and 
beliefs that individuals have developed about many pertinent experiencings they have had in the 
past. Hence, a key indicator of long-term memory-based introquestion is that persons can 
generate such self-reports on demand and in any given situation including situations that are 
completely unrelated to the kinds of experiencings enquired (e.g., when asked to complete an 
online survey about fear of speaking in public) and in which the target individuals may not even 
be present (e.g., online assessments of others).  
4. Encoding the perceived properties into the signs used as ‘data’: Processes involved 
and basic conversion principles 
To generate scientific data, persons must encode the perceived occurrences of relevant 
properties of the study phenomena systematically and according to explicitly defined assignment 
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rules into the signs used as ‘data’. This encoding (also coding) and its implementation in a given 
method is the second pivotal point of data generation.  
In encoding schemes, researchers specify the particular agreements that are made in a 
study about which particular pieces of information about the phenomena under study, as 
perceived and conceived by human individuals (e.g., researchers, observers), can be 
demarcated and categorised in what ways and how the thus-defined elements or events shall be 
represented by what particular signs used as data (e.g., behavioural variables, numerals). These 
issues of operational definition and assignment are well known and frequently discussed. But 
what specifically must the data-generating persons accomplish during this encoding process? 
The metatheoretical concepts above allow to explore these processes on more abstract levels of 
consideration to open up new perspective not yet seen that way. 
4.1 The phenomena’s frames of reference and conversions of information between 
phenomena of different kind 
The distinct constellations of metatheoretical properties, because they determine 
accessibility by humans, establish for each given kind of phenomenon its own frame of reference 
that is applicable to other kinds of phenomena only to some degree or not at all. Therefore, 
these frames of reference determine the ways in which information from one kind of 
phenomenon can be represented in another one; this is called conversion in the TPS-Paradigm 
(Uher, 2015d)  
Conversions of information happen all the time individuals are communicating. To 
transmit information from their internal psychical systems (e.g., thoughts, ideas) to their outer 
world, individuals must represent this information in external physical phenomena that others 
can directly perceive (e.g., verbal and nonverbal behaviours, visual patterns on paper); this is 
called external physicalisation in the TPS Paradigm. Others can use these perceivable external 
physical phenomena (commonly termed signals in communication research) to infer the ideas 
and meanings that they believe the sender may have intended to convey, thereby representing 
this information in their own psychical systems, thus in internal psychical phenomena (see 
Figure 1). Hence, communication involves back and forth conversions of information between 
internal-psychical and external-physical phenomena (Uher 2016a; Uher 2015a). Problems 
occurring in communication processes are distortion and loss of information (see Ellis and 
Beattie 1986). 
Data generation involves the conversion of information about the phenomena under 
study (e.g., physical objects, individual behaviours) into information encoded in the phenomena 
used as ‘data’. Data are semiotic representations (signs, symbols), that is, external physical 
representations (e.g., variable names and numerals printed on paper or screen) to which 
particular individuals (e.g., researchers, observers, raters) assign particular meanings (e.g., 
meanings of numbers) and particular referents (e.g., perceived properties of the phenomena 
under study; see Section v). What distortions or losses of information may occur in this encoding 
process? 
4.2 Metatheoretical commensurability and three basic conversion principles  
The demands that conversions of information impose on the persons generating the data 
and the challenges involved can be explored on the basis of the three metatheoretical properties 
and of properties ascribed to the signs (symbols) that are used as data (e.g., mathematical 
properties of numerals). Specifically, if two kinds of phenomena share the same constellation of 
forms with regard to the three metatheoretical properties, then isomorphisms between them can 
be high and their frames of reference can be considered as completely metatheoretically 
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commensurable (from the Latin commensurabilis for having a common measure). Complete 
metatheoretical commensurability facilitates conversions of information between phenomena of 
different kind, such as between the phenomena under study (e.g., physical objects, individuals’ 
morphology) and the physical phenomena used as signs for data generation (e.g., lexical 
variables, numerals written on paper). Thus, complete metatheoretical commensurability 
facilitates the assignment task that persons generating data have to accomplish. It also 
facilitates the development of physical methods (see Section 3.3), including technologies 
enabling automated conversions of information (e.g., technical measurement instruments; see 
Figure 2). 




If different frames of reference must be conceived, conversions of information may 
inevitably entail distortion or even loss of information, which is studied, amongst others, in 
concepts of measurement error and uncertainty. (For this reason, the term conversion is used 
rather than translation or transcription, which implies loss-free conversion of information between 
different media.) Significant distortion or loss of relevant information entails that the frame of 
reference of a particular semiotic system cannot be used to appropriately represent information 
from the phenomena under study, thus hindering their scientific exploration.  
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Differences in the phenomena’s frames of references can occur with regard the three 
metatheoretical properties that determine a phenomenon’s perceptibility by humans, which can 
be formalised in three basic conversion principles (Uher, 2015d). Conversion Principle 1 states 
that differences in the phenomena’s location internal or external to the studied individual’s body 
may constrain conversions of information if, through these conversions, the phenomena under 
study are altered in themselves. This entails challenges, for example, for research on 
physiological phenomena (e.g., metabolic phenomena) but in particular for research on 
psychological phenomena (e.g., experiencings; see Section 3.3.1). 
Conversion Principle 2 denotes that constraints for conversions of information may arise 
if the phenomena involved differ in their temporal extension, in particular, if one or even both of 
them feature events of variable temporal extension. This variability increases the demands 
imposed on the persons generating data because, without special provisions (as arranged, e.g., 
in races), the temporal extensions of different events cannot be perceived together at any given 
moment, thus hindering direct comparisons and requiring technical support for data generation. 
This entails challenges in particular for research on behavioural and psychical phenomena.  
Conversion Principle 3 denotes that differences in the phenomena’s physical properties 
may constrain conversions of information between them, in particular, if they feature elements of 
variable spatial extension because this complicates their categorisation and comparison by the 
persons generating the data. But unparalleled challenges emerge when spatial extension cannot 
be conceived at all as is the case for psychical phenomena that, moreover, are accessible only 
introquestively by each individual itself and by nobody else. This substantially complicates 
explorations of the conversions of information that individuals have applied when externalising 
information from their psychical systems.   
The challenges specified in these three abstract principles often occur together, which 
increases the demands placed on the persons generating data. For example, behavioural events 
show pronounced and complex variations in both their temporal and their spatial extensions 
(Conversion Principles 2 and 3), making their categorisation in a given moment highly 
challenging for the persons generating data (e.g., how to categorise raising an arm, see Section 
2; Uher & Visalberghi 2016).  
But some of these challenges can be mitigated. This applies in particular to physical 
phenomena that, given their extroquestive accessibility, enable the development of physical 
methods that facilitate or can even replace direct perception by humans with automated 
conversions of information (e.g., technical measurement instruments; see Figure 2; Section 3.3). 
What does this involve? 
4.3 Consent-based commensurability 
When the frames of reference of different kinds of phenomena can be assumed to have 
only partial metatheoretical commensurability (i.e., differ in some but not all three properties), 
then commensurability must be established on the basis of decisions. These decisions must be 
made by the persons who convert information from their perceptions and conceptions of the 
phenomena under study into information encoded in the phenomena used as signs (e.g., 
symbols in check sheets or on computer screen).  
When these decisions are made explicit and specified in intersubjective agreement, this 
is referred to as consent-based commensurability (see Figure 1). For example, when 
behavioural scientists develop and test the encoding schemes specifying the behavioural events 
to be observed, they establish intersubjective consent in the ways in which perceivable 
properties of these behaviours should be demarcated and categorised, and how their 
occurrences should be encoded in the signs used as data (e.g., behavioural variables, 
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numerals). This intersubjective consent is also essential for training observers to target their 
perceptions to the behavioural events specified and to use these encoding schemes in 
systematic and standardised ways, which is statistically tested in terms of inter-observer or inter-
coder reliability. Intersubjective consent also underlies the conventions that scientists and 
engineers establish and use to develop technical devices that enable automated conversions of 
information from phenomena featuring events of variable spatio-temporal dimensions as well as 
the particular calibrations that are implemented in each single device (e.g., heart rate monitors, 
EEG, blood count analysers). 
The abstract metatheoretical level on which the three conversion principles are 
formulated helps to specify the unparalleled challenges that arise for psychologists and social 
scientist from the unique properties of the phenomena of the psyche. These are a) the 
immaterial and “non-physical” properties of psychical phenomena and of social phenomena 
arising from them (Conversion Principle 3), b) the only transient access individuals have to these 
phenomena in their ongoing experiencings (Conversion Principle 2), c) the only indirect access 
scientists can have via individuals’ externalisations (apart from self-explorations), and d) the fact 
that introquestion and externalisation inevitably alter and change the course of experiencings 
(Conversion Principle 1; see Sections 3.3.2 and 4.2). This unique constellation entails that, 
between the frames of reference that can be conceived for psychical phenomena and those 
conceivable for the phenomena used as data in some research methods, no metatheoretical 
commensurability can be assumed (i.e., they differ in all three metatheoretical properties). 
Metatheoretical commensurability between individuals’ experiencings and their externalisations 
can be, at best, only partial (e.g., behaviours and verbal reports share the transience of 
experiencings but not their internality and “non-physicality”). This makes one-to-one 
externalisations of experiencings and, vice versa, one-to-one inferences from externalisations to 
individuals’ experiencings impossible and requires methods enabling the establishment of at 
least consent-based commensurability (Figure 2).  
5. Discussion and conclusions 
The above-presented metatheoretical concepts and methodological principles open up 
new perspectives on the ways in which data are generated in the different sciences. They 
highlighted commonalities and differences in the two pivotal points of data generation: 1) in the 
accessibility that various kinds of phenomena have for the persons generating the data and the 
researchers, and 2), as a consequence thereof, in the processes involved in the encoding of 
information from these phenomena in the signs (symbols) used as data. These concepts and 
principles cut across various previous concepts of data generation established in different fields. 
Their abstract level of consideration provides a common language for comparative explorations 
of the data generation methods used in different sciences, and in particular to specify the 
fundamental challenges involved in the exploration of psychical phenomena that scientists from 
all fields have highlighted in various ways.  
This final section therefore discusses new insights that the metatheoretical concepts and 
methodological principles open up on various methods used for exploring psychical phenomena 
to pinpoint methodical insufficiencies not well considered. Discussions focus on the so-called 
‘qualitative-quantitative’ methods debate in psychology and the social sciences, on introspective 
methods used in psychophysics, and on assessment methods used in psychometrics. 
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5.1 So-called ‘qualitative versus quantitative methods’: Differences in establishing 
consent-based commensurability and metatheoretical criteria of ‘appropriateness’ 
In many so-called ‘qualitative methods’, psychologists and social scientist explore 
individuals’ externalisations (e.g., verbal reports in interviews, discussions in focus groups, 
written reports in textual analyses) in order to infer from these materials the actual phenomena 
under study (e.g., individuals’ experiencings, social beliefs). As this is, necessarily, a subjective 
process, qualitative researchers commonly make their own interpretations of the externalisations 
studied and the inferences that they make from these externalisations explicit in order to 
establish an intersubjective consent about the interpretations and inferences they are making 
(e.g., inter-subject comprehensibility; Steinke 2004). Methods in which these intersubjective 
discussions also involve the studied individuals themselves (e.g., communicative validation; Flick 
2008) constitute for these individuals a retro-introquestive exploration of the conversion 
decisions that they have made while externalising their experiencings. For all persons involved 
in this process (individuals studied and researchers), such methods constitute introquestive 
explorations of the decisions they are making to convert information contained in individuals’ 
externalisations (external, physical) into the meanings (internal, physical) that the given 
externalisations (e.g., sentences transcribed) have for them (see Figure 1). Thus, in qualitative 
methods, psychologists and social scientists try to make explicit as good as possible the 
conversion decisions that are being made in these investigations—within the limits inevitably 
entailed by the peculiarities of psychical phenomena.  
In many so-called ‘quantitative methods’, by contrast, in which the persons generating 
the data are asked to indicate their assessments (ratings) on predefined rating scales (e.g., 
personality questionnaires), psychologists and social scientists do not enquire about the 
conversion and encoding decisions that these persons have made while generating the data. 
Nor do they commonly make explicit these persons’ interpretations of the questionnaire 
statements and answer categories that are used to indirectly explore psychical phenomena. 
Questionnaires are commonly worded in everyday language often using rather general everyday 
statements (e.g., “is the life of the party”) to enable their application to a wide range of 
phenomena (e.g., situations, behaviours and experiences) yet without specifying any particular 
ones. Unlike observers, raters are commonly not trained about how to interpret and use the 
questionnaire scales; instead, researchers capitalise on raters’ common-sense knowledge to 
interpret the meaning of the item statements and answer categories provided.  
But unlike scientific terms and concepts, people’s everyday terms and concepts are often 
fuzzy and context-sensitive (Hammersley, 2013). A questionnaire scale’s meaning evolves as a 
product of cognitive information processing in the particular moments and contexts in which 
raters generate their responses. How they do that and what specifically they consider is 
commonly not enquired. Meanwhile, various studies have demonstrated that standardised 
questionnaire statements are interpreted very differently, both within and among persons (e.g., 
Arro 2013; Lundmann and Villadsen 2016; Rosenbaum and Valsiner 2011; Uher and Visalberghi 
2016; Valsiner et al. 2005). Thus, in assessment methods, it remains unknown what specific 
phenomena and properties the persons under study (as well as the researchers studying them) 
are actually considering with regard to the items statements used and what specific decisions 
they have made to convert information about them into the fixed scales provided.  
The metatheoretical concepts and methodological principles highlight that, to be 
appropriate for particular study phenomena, data generation methods must 1) enable the 
persons generating the data to directly perceive the study phenomena while they are generating 
them (direct accessibility) and 2) enable at least consent-based commensurability to be 
established in the encoding systems or, for psychical phenomena, in the interpretations of and 
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inferences from the externalisations used to indirectly study psychical phenomena. Standardised 
assessment methods do not enable researchers to meet this latter criterion (in other-
assessments none of them) and are thus not appropriate for the study of psychical phenomena. 
Commonly, standardised assessments (rating scales) are considered ‘quantitative methods’ 
because they are used to generate numerical data—by converting the responses to the scales’ 
fixed answer categories into numerals and by treating these numerals as numbers. But 
standardised assessment methods do not allow researchers to specify the conversion rules that 
are being applied to generate the raw data (the ticks in the scales) in the first place. This 
precludes the establishment of traceability, a fundamental requirement of measurement (see 
Sections 1.1 and 1.2).   
5.2 Introspective methods used in psychophysics: Methodical mismatches 
The metatheoretical differentiation of various kinds of phenomena on the basis of their 
particular constellation of perceptual modes for humans highlighted that each kind of 
phenomenon can be studied only by a particular class of methods and that, vice versa, no 
method allows for exploring all kinds of phenomena. The frequent lack of differentiation between 
phenomena of different kind, such as between behaviour and psyche, therefore entails 
methodological mismatches that limit the abilities of studies to capture the phenomena toward 
which they are targeted.  
In the history of psychology, various methods have been developed to quantify psychical 
abilities. The oldest of these methods were developed in psychophysics, a field of psychology 
devoted to exploring sensory perceptions and their relations to physical stimuli (G. T. Fechner, 
1860). In psychophysical experiments, individuals are asked to report about how they perceive 
particular physical stimuli presented to them, such as just noticeable differences in the 
brightness of sources of light or the volume or pitch of sounds. Commonly, psychophysical 
methods are interpreted as introspective. But the stimuli presented to the persons generating the 
data are external to their bodies and can therefore be perceived also by the researchers. The 
crucial criterion of perceptibility by multiple individuals highlights that psychophysical methods 
explore individuals’ perceptions of external physical phenomena and are thus extroquestive. In 
fact, it is the physical stimuli’s extroquestive accessibility that first enables their identical 
repetition and systematic variation by the researchers (i.e., experimentation) as well as 
comparisons of the stimuli’s quantitative variations with individuals’ subjective intensity 
judgements as described, for example, in the Weber-Fechner Law (Fechner, 1888; Uher 2016a). 
But apart from mere perceptions, which are always involved in any kind of investigation in 
physics and psychology alike (see Section 1.2), extroquestive methods do not allow for exploring 
psychical phenomena, such as the thoughts and emotions that individuals may have while 
judging and comparing the physical stimuli that they perceive in psychophysical experiments as 
well as the meanings and memories that individuals may associate with these stimuli. In 
individuals’ perceptions, inward and outward perspectives, always merge together in any given 
moment (Wundt, 1896). Attempts to separate these perspectives by simply wording instructions 
differently, such as “tell me if you visually experience a sound” versus “tell me when the sound 
occurs” (Schwitzgebel, 2016), overlook that self-reports in psychophysical studies always involve 
the outward perspective as well—otherwise, individuals could not report about the external 
stimuli presented to them.  
These insights have important consequences. Contrary to beliefs widespread in 
psychology, findings about individuals’ perceptions of physical phenomena cannot be 
generalised to all psychical phenomena, which, given their non-spatial properties, differ 
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fundamentally from the spatially extended phenomena the perception of which is studied in 
psychophysics. 
5.3 Standardised assessment methods for capturing transient phenomena: Mismatches 
in psychometrics 
Psychophysicists “successes” stimulated the development of methods for quantifying 
further psychical phenomena (e.g., attitudes, personality) for which assessment methods (rating 
scales; (Thurstone, 1927, 1928) have become widely established in psychology and the social 
sciences. Today, assessment methods (and further methods, e.g., intelligence tests) are 
developed in psychometrics, the field concerned with developing theories and methods for 
“measuring” psychical phenomena. The metatheoretical concepts are now applied to scrutinise 
the ways in which assessment methods differ from observations. 
Assessments are based on fundamentally different procedures of data generation than 
observations. Observations are nunc-ipsum extroquestive methods. The events to be recorded 
in observations are publicly accessible, enabling the shared perception of one and the same 
event by multiple persons. The same methodological principle underlies the real-time recording 
of transient physical phenomena supported by (wearable) technologies, in which automated 
processes are used to record human activity in real-life contexts (e.g., pedometer; Electronically 
Activated Recorder [EAR], (M R Mehl, Pennebaker, Crow, Dabbs, & Price, 2001). Observers as 
well as monitoring technologies record the occurrences and non-occurrences of specified events 
(e.g., behavioural acts) while or immediately after these occur. Consequently, the raw data are 
binary (or nominal), except when observers directly count the frequencies of events or when 
durations are measured using stopwatch by recording start and end of processes, which are 
ultimately binary events as well. But nunc-ipsum generated raw data cannot reflect any 
information about individuals’ overall scores or even differences among individuals. Such 
information can be obtained only after the data generation is completed in subsequent steps of 
data analysis, in which the raw data are first aggregated across measurement occasions within 
individuals into individual summary scores that can then be compared among individuals.  
Standardised assessments, by contrast, require raters to generate raw data that directly 
reflect individual summary scores (e.g., in some frequency ratings) and even relative differences 
among individuals (e.g., in personality ratings). This evaluation is possible only because 
assessments are introquestive and inherently retrospective and long-term memory-based 
methods. For this reason, standardised assessments cannot capture transient phenomena (e.g., 
behaviours, experiencings) as sometimes assumed (e.g., behaviour ratings). The application of 
assessments in some methods of experience sampling illustrates this. 
Experience sampling methods involve self-reports about experiencings that individuals 
have in everyday life situations (Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014; Matthias R. Mehl & Conner, 
2012). Methods asking individuals at random occasions during the day to report in real-time 
about the experiencings they may have in these moments are nunc-ipsum introquestive. 
Methods asking individuals to report about the specific experiencings they have had on a 
specific day, such as in diary studies, are retro-introquestive. But methods asking individuals to 
provide such self-reports on rating scales, such as to evaluate the intensity of their current 
experiencings, require individuals to compare these ongoing events with similar experiencings 
they have had in the past, but which, necessarily, have already ceased to be and from which 
individuals can have retained only memorised psychical resultants. Thus, raters are required to 
compare their ongoing experiencings with the knowledge, beliefs and ideas they have developed 
about such experiencings in the past and to mentally generate an overall judgement that reflects 
differences over time and often also among individuals. But such differences cannot be directly 
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perceived an any given moment; they are abstractions and constructions of the human mind. 
Thus, standardised assessment methods always rely on long-term memory-based retro-
introquestion. Their application for recording transient events like experiencings or behaviours, 
even if applied in the moments in which these occur, constitutes a methodological mismatch.  
5.4 Outlook 
The presented metatheoretical concepts and methodological principles provide novel 
lines of argumentation that substantiate psychologists’ and social scientists’ increasing criticism 
of their own disciplines’ focus on standardised assessment methods and establish connections 
to concepts of data generation developed in metrology. The classification of data collection 
methods based on the study phenomena’s accessibility for persons during data generation cuts 
across common method categorisations, which are based on properties of the data once they 
were generated (e.g., qualitative, quantitative). This sheds new light on commonalities and 
differences in the methods used in different sciences. 
Researching the diverse kinds of phenomena that occur in individuals inherently requires 
the application of a plurality of methods and approaches, some of which are complementary to 
one another. The three meta-theoretical properties determining a study phenomenon’s 
perceptibility by humans and the methodological principles derived from them constitute an 
elementary system to guide researchers through this plurality to select the methods that are 
appropriate to their particular study phenomena and to the demands that these phenomena’s 
peculiarities impose on the persons generating the data.  
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